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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of heterogeneous wealth on credit allocation from
an egalitarian opportunity and an eﬃciency point of view. Under asymmetric information
on both wealth and the responsibility variable there is no trade-oﬀ between equality and
eﬃciency, actually wealth inequality delivers both inequality of opportunity and ineﬃciency.
Due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, poor entrepreneurs, other things equal, realize
better projects. This notwithstanding, due to the bidimensional hidden information, they
may be rationed out or obtain a loan only at the cost of cross subsidizing bad projects
realized by rich entrepreneurs. In the ﬁrst case ineﬃciency arises in the form of insuﬃcient
investment, in the second in the form of ineﬃcient projects being realized. An egalitarian
redistribution of endowments may lead to perfect screening, no ineﬃciencies in the allocation
of credit and equality of opportunity.
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1 Introduction
The credit market is supposed to transfer resources from savers without an entrepreneurial option,
to illiquid would-be entrepreneurs, creating surplus in the process. However imperfect informa-
tion may interfere with a fair and eﬃcient allocation of credit. Collateral may be required for
incentive or screening purposes putting the relatively poor entrepreneurs at a disadvantage. We
investigate the properties of equilibria in credit markets with heterogeneous wealth entrepreneurs
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA, hereafter), under the Equality of Op-
portunity (EOp) benchmark and explore the relationship with correlated ineﬃciencies in credit
allocations.
The ideal of a society in which no one suﬀers disadvantage on grounds of unequal opportunities
is widely upheld as desirable. The requirement extends far beyond the vague injunction to
eschew public sphere discrimination as it implies a central normative investigation for deciding
on which grounds one might justify responsibility-sensitive policy interventions. The idea of
competing on equal terms was formalized in the Equality of Opportunity principle which requires
the distinction between unchosen circumstances and individual choices (see among egalitarian
philosophers, Rawls (1971) and Sen (1973)). The former are terms imposed on an individual in
ways that she could not have inﬂuenced or controlled; these terms are just given. The latter,
instead, constitute the personal responsibility of individuals. Main exogenous circumstances for
instance include the wealth inherited and early environment provided by parents and, in general,
all the features of the world in which one ﬁnds oneself prior to any opportunity for responsible
choice (Roemer, 1998). In the last 20 years the opportunity egalitarian literature has extended
on the measurement of inequality of opportunity as a tool to implement an eﬃciency-enhancing
redistribution.1
The EOp principle requires that jobs and options to borrow money for investment purposes,
such as starting a business, should be open to all applicants (think of young applicants or new
borrowers). However a strong evidence demonstrates unequivocally that entry in the credit
market is heavily wealth-dependent, and that potential investment is constrained by personal
1A variety of measures was adopted with the aim of separating `inequality of opportunity' and `responsibility
sensitive inequality', and was applied mainly in the context of income inequality but also in taxation, education,
health. For a survey, see Pignataro (2012).
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and family wealth (Evans and Jovanovich, 1989). Most empirical contributions lie in the ﬁeld
of development economics, where ineﬃciencies in credit market are likely to be tantamount
(for comprehensive surveys, see Benabou, 1996; Banerjee, 2002; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2010).
Wealth dependence can be the product of many factors, among which endogenous risk preferences
(Cressy, 2000) or myopic consumption, but most recent evidence refutes the hypotheses that these
factors are the sole relevant (see for instance Kan and Tsai, 2006 and Berg, 2012). The likely
explanation is that imperfect information may force the bank to choose on the basis of collateral
provision. This in turn may be due to the need to control for opportunistic entrepreneurial
behaviour or to screen better applicants in presence of hidden information. We build an imperfect
information model that ﬁts well with most stylized facts about credit markets in developing
economies as reported by Banerjee and Duﬂo (2010), in particular with the fact that rich people
borrow more (wealth dependence) and pay lower interest rates. We will use a further stylized
fact, e.g., that monopoly power does not appear to be a cause for high interest rates, as an
assumption.2
Our model entails bidimensional heterogeneity among individuals with hidden information
and moral hazard. Potential entrepreneurs diﬀer for both circumstances and personal responsi-
bility. Circumstances are perfectly represented by the ex-ante endowed wealth, while the indi-
viduals' responsibility variable is codiﬁed as eﬀort aversion (an indicator of preferences) aﬀecting
the measure of the chosen actions (eﬀort) the individual takes. Eﬀort aversion aﬀects individual
willingness to supply eﬀort and therefore measures (inversely), other things equal, the propensity
of individual to work hard. We want to investigate the properties of the equilibrium in a frame-
work where both features are unobservable by competitive lenders. We investigate in particular
whether moral hazard and adverse selection involve the violation of the equality of opportunity
principle.
Our characterizing assumptions are that individuals' wealth is not publicly observable, while
agents exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA, hereafter)3. This ﬁrst assumption re-
quires some discussion4. In most of the credit market literature (except for Stiglitz and Weiss,
2The last fact reported, high lending rates, is outside the scope of this paper.
3For the empirical evidence in favour of the DARA assumption, see among others, Black (1996); Ogaki and
Zhang (2001).
4For a ,more complete discussion see Coco and Pignataro (2013).
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1992; Coco and Pignataro, 2013) wealth is supposed to be observable while entrepreneurial abil-
ity is not. However in other ﬁelds (for example tax evasion), the idea that ﬁnancial income and
wealth positions of individuals are common knowledge would be considered rather odd. The idea
that a bank oﬃcial can assess the extent of one individual's wealth is even stranger. In most
papers the assumption of common knowledge on wealth possibly proxies for the belief that there
are no reasons to conceal one's wealth. In this paper this is not the case because decreasing risk
aversion may turn wealth into a bad signal. We assume heterogeneity and asymmetric informa-
tion also on the responsibility variable. This makes the model more realistic and allows us to
discuss the equilibria in terms of the EOp paradigm.
This bidimensional asymmetric information and the ensuing moral hazard complicate con-
siderably the game5. In a situation where individuals are risk averse, their willingness to bear
risk is an important additional channel through which the distribution of wealth determines the
contract form with the eﬃciency and the equity properties of equilibrium. In particular, DARA
gives the personal endowment a new role in providing incentives that can mitigate or exacerbate
information problems. More wealth (and less risk aversion) negatively impacts on eﬀort provi-
sion (see Newman, 2007). Adverse selection on wealth types is therefore endogenously generated
by diﬀerent optimal levels of eﬀort along the distribution of wealth. As a consequence poor
individuals end up as hard-working agents, other things equal. Moreover for each wealth class,
preferences on eﬀort aversion aﬀect eﬀort provision as well and the two dimensions interact in a
complex manner.
We consider a contract space in terms of collateral and interest rate. Risk aversion and eﬀort
aversion (through their consequent eﬀort choice) determine the willingness to post collateral and
therefore the existence and the form of equilibrium. Risk aversion inﬂuences the willingness
to post collateral both directly and through eﬀort choice (moral hazard) in diﬀerent directions.
When the moral hazard channel dominates, no equilibrium exists where poor entrepreneurs can
be served. Instead when the direct eﬀect of risk aversion prevails, we discover a unique pure
strategy sub-game perfect equilibrium in the screening game. For some preferences, only some
poor entrepreneurs are excluded from the market. Diﬀerent risk classes (rich and poor) may be
pooled at a single contract in equilibrium, where cross-subsidization occurs not only between
5See Aney et al. (2012) for a case of bidimensional heterogeneity with observable wealth.
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wealth classes but also between diﬀerent eﬀort aversion types. The credit market equilibrium is
then characterized by inequality of opportunity and ineﬃciency in contrast with the traditional
trade-oﬀ. The rich are charged a low rate of interest (relative to their risk) even if they are
characterized by high level of eﬀort aversion, while poor borrowers (with low eﬀort aversion) are
charged too high an interest rate. We then demonstrate that inequality of opportunity and the
perverse redistribution prospect are always associated to ineﬃciency. When hard working poor
individuals are excluded from credit lines, some potential surplus is not realized. On the other
side when cross subsidization occurs some surplus-wasting projects are carried out.
Of course the result that poor entrepreneurs may be rationed out or served at worse term
contracts has already been discussed in the literature. It is worth to point out however that ex-
clusion or worse term on credit result from the inability to write incentive compatible contracts
in the presence of ex-post moral hazard (see for instance Banjeree and Newman, 1993) also in
connection with the existence of a quasi-ﬁxed lending cost (for a useful survey Banjeree and
Duﬂo 2010). In this case borrowing is obviously constrained by the amount of assets owned. A
discussion of whether ex-ante or ex-post moral hazard is more important in the credit market is
widely beyond the scope of this paper, but certainly most of the literature of the credit market
uses our setting. One could also contend that the assumption of ex-post moral hazard, that
is the possibility of strategic bankruptcy and ﬂight of the borrower is more likely and relevant
in a developed and mobile context rather than in developing countries. Also the possibility of
endogenous cross-subsidization has appeared in the theoretical literature (e.g. among others,
Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Black and de Meza, 1997; de Meza and Webb, 1999, 2000; Ghatak
et al., 2007; Martin, 2009; Parker, 2003), but not between diﬀerent wealth classes. Moreover the
interplay between equity, implicit redistribution and eﬃciency has not been discussed satisfac-
torily so far. Our results link convincingly ineﬃciencies, originating in a wrongful allocation of
credit, to inequality and inequality of opportunity in a novel way, denying forcefully the existence
of the classic trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency objectives
Our modeling strategy follows the literature on ex-ante imperfect information in the credit
market (de Meza and Webb, 1987) and in particular the theory of collateral use. Ineﬃcient levels
of investments may occur notwithstanding collateral (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987;
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for survey see Coco, 2000) serving as a screening device6. Related to our work are also the papers
by Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) and Coco (1999). They demonstrate the impossibility of screening
by collateral in the credit market with two classes of borrowers with diﬀerent risk attitudes.
Risk preferences and project quality interact through moral hazard in conﬂicting ways, so that
collateral is not a meaningful signal of project quality. Finally, Gruner (2003) considers a setting
where rich borrowers crowd out productive poor ones. He suggests that an ex-ante complete
redistribution of endowments, by inducing the substitution of rich entrepreneurs with poor ones,
may lead to a Pareto-improvement due to a rise in the risk-free interest rate.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model while section
3 discuss the characterization of the loan contracts. The inequality of opportunity equilibrium
is instead investigated in section 4. Concluding remarks follow in section 5.
2 The model
Consider a one period competitive credit market populated by entrepreneurs owning projects
with risky income streams. Each project requires both (ﬁxed) investment capital K and eﬀort
supplied by the entrepreneur. Speciﬁcally the uncertain revenue from an investment can take one
of the two values, Y in the event of successful state with a certain level of probability p(e) and
zero in case of failure with probability (1 − p(e)) where e ∈ [0, e¯] denotes the amount of eﬀort.
Returns to eﬀort are positive and diminishing as usual, i.e., p′(e) > 0 and p′′(e) < 0. In more
general terms, a higher level of eﬀort e results in a project whose returns ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates (FOSD) the project returns with lower levels of eﬀort (De Meza and Webb, 1987).
Utility for the would-be borrowers is a concave increasing function that exhibits DARA, i.e.,
d(−U ′′(w)/U ′(w))/dw < 0 and U(w = 0) = −∞. Each agent has a diﬀerent amount of illiquid
wealth wi, i ∈ [R,P ] for rich and poor respectively, which are both insuﬃcient to achieve full
collateralization, wi < (1 + r)K, and is also illiquid at the moment of the realization of the
project This implies the need to borrow the whole amount of capital, K, in order to undertake
6Empirical evidence suggests that in developing countries, lenders may enforce collateral free loans using
third-party guarantees and relationship lending, see Menkhoﬀa et al. (2012) on this issue with an investigation
in Thailand.
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the investment projects. Moreover let us denote X = (1 + r)K as the total repayment where
r is the interest rate required by the bank for an amount of collateral c. Individuals diﬀer
also because of a scalar indexed eﬀort aversion µj , j ∈ [L,H] which can be respectively low
or high. We assume that a project realized by entrepreneurs with a low eﬀort aversion (L)
may have a positive net value, while high eﬀort aversion (H) always induces such a low level
of eﬀort that its net return is negative7. As a consequence projects of types−H should not
be undertaken from a social perspective, as they produce less than the resources employed.
Moreover an equilibrium with separation of types−H can be ruled out from the outset. While
simplifying considerably the picture this assumption is quite realistic in delivering a world in
which some potential entrepreneurs are basically looters (in the words of Akerlof et al., 2003)
and could only realize their projects when obtaining pooling contracts with positive net present
value projects/entrepreneurs.
Besides being characterized by L (low) or H (high) eﬀort aversion, entrepreneurs diﬀer also
for their endowment and they may be either of type R (rich) or P (poor). The two features of
the borrowers are distributed independently in the population and therefore λ is the proportion
of rich borrowers while (1 − λ) is the proportion of poor ones in the market. Further v is the
proportion ofH−borrowers in the market and (1−v) is the proportion of L−ones. The borrower's
wealth wi, her own eﬀort aversion µj and her consequent eﬀort choice e(wi, µj) are known to
the individual but not observable by a competitive lender. The expected utility of a borrower ij
equals the expected net revenue from the project minus the cost of eﬀort:
Uij(X, c) = p(eij)U(Y −Xij + wij) + (1− p(eij))U(wij − cij)− µjeij (1)
Intuitively, if a lender can observe a borrower's level of eﬀort and can enforce an eﬀort con-
tingent contract, then there is no moral hazard and a ﬁrst-best outcome will emerge. If such
a contract is not possible then moral hazard persists and the lender must infer e∗(wi, µj), the
participating borrowers' optimal level of eﬀort as a function of wealth w and eﬀort aversion µ.
7This assumption is introduced to simplify the treatment, but it is not restrictive. As we are going to see in
the next sections the contracts designed could be rewritten as contracts in which entrepreneurs at H−levels has a
positive expected return with a potential separation among wealth classes. We adopt the former characterization
because it makes contracts easier to analyse delivering a more tractable framework in the inequality of opportunity
perspective.
7
Bertrand competition in the credit market implies that the payment speciﬁed by the contract
must be such that a competitive lender just expects to break even and so (2) is equal to zero.
Now consider the case of ex-ante asymmetric information. Lenders know the wealth distribution
of borrowers, but are not able to distinguish the particular borrower's wealth when a loan appli-
cation is made. We assume zero risk-free interest rate and an inﬁnitely elastic supply of funds
in the deposit market. In such a scenario it is known that the standard optimal form of ﬁnance
would be equity, but assuming unveriﬁable ex-post returns makes debt the only feasible form
of ﬁnance (see de Meza and Webb, 2000). For a single borrower, a bank's expected proﬁt from
accepting an application for a contract from a type−ij is given by:
piij = p(eij)Xij + (1− p(eij))cij −K (2)
In the successful state entrepreneurs pay back the amount borrowed X with probability
p(eij) otherwise the banks keep the amount of resources put up as collateral c. Entrepreneurs
and banks sign a contract of the general form {X, c}. We seek subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the following two-stage screening game à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)8. In the ﬁrst
stage, banks compete for the pool of customers whose type is unknown to them. They may
potentially oﬀer applicant borrowers a menu of loan contracts {Xij , cij} ∈ ij {R,P} × {L;H}.
Then entrepreneurs are able to weigh up the pros and cons of entering the market and, if so,
choose their preferred oﬀer (one) among those available. Therefore formally a Nash equilibrium
here is a set of contracts such that (1) each bank earn nonnegative proﬁts on each contract and
(2) there exists no other (set of) contract that would earn positive expected proﬁts if oﬀered in
addition to the original set. We restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria.
8The general structure of our model uses the deﬁnition of pure-strategy equilibria proposed by Bester (1985).
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3 Characterization of loan contracts
3.1 Agents'preference map
In the standard explanation of separation among classes (Bester, 1985), the whole weight of
screening is borne by the amount of collateral required on contracts to sort good and bad risk.
In the present multidimensional context, instead, the banks' statistical inference problem is more
complicated. A borrower signing a contract which requires to post higher levels of collateral may
belong to the rich or the poor class (unless collateral exceeds the poor's wealth) but at the same
time she can be relatively highly-averse to supply eﬀort, inﬂuencing adversely the performance
of the contract.
To explore further the eﬀect of wealth and eﬀort aversion on eﬀort choice we must temporarily
analyse a case where the two variables are continuously distributed. We start by looking at the
eﬀect of moral hazard. Using eq. (1), the ﬁrst order condition for the borrower's optimal choice
of eﬀort e∗(wi, µj) is given by:
p′(eij)U(Y −X + wi)− p′(eij)U(wi − c) = µj (3)
Eq. (3) shows that the borrower supplies eﬀort until the expected value of marginal eﬀort equals
its marginal cost. The maximization conditions are satisﬁed since the probability of success
p(eij) is concave. Rearranging eq. (3), the optimal choice of eﬀort e
∗
ij(wi, µj) is described by:
p′(e∗ij) =
µj
U(Y −X + wi)− U(wi − c) (4)
From straightforward comparative statics it follows that
de∗ij
dY > 0;
de∗ij
dc > 0;
de∗ij
dX < 0 as is
customary in moral hazard models. On one side a higher amount of collateral reﬂects higher
penalty in case of failure, providing incentives in eﬀort. On the other side a higher repayment
negatively impacts the borrower's return in case of success, but not in the case of failure. This
reduces incentives to supply eﬀort.
As shown in Newman (2007), it may be argued that more wealth and less risk aversion
worsen the moral hazard issue. In particular in our model the adverse selection on wealth types
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endogenously generated as a function of diﬀerent choices of eﬀort is combined with the role
attributed to eﬀort aversion. A multidimensional moral hazard eﬀect changes as a combined
function of DARA and eﬀort aversion.
Consider a case where the terms of the bank contract are ﬁxed for all borrowers. We deﬁne for
any class (level) of wealth, wi, the marginal borrower as the individual who is indiﬀerent between
exiting and remaining active in the credit market. As a direct consequence the marginal set is
deﬁned as the set of individuals indiﬀerent between two options along the wealth distribution.
Under these conditions, one can show that there exists a negative relation between eﬀort and
wealth, i.e., the marginal eﬀort is lower, the higher is the wealth of individuals:
de∗ij
dw
< 0 (5)
Proof. See the Appendix
while at the same time, a negative correspondence between eﬀort and aversion is established,
de∗ij
dµ
< 0 (6)
Proof. See the Appendix
which implies that individuals with a higher eﬀort aversion also display a higher probability
of default due to moral hazard. Since the marginal individuals capture the lowest share of project
expected returns, their choice of eﬀort is farthest from the socially eﬃcient value.
Because of decreasing risk aversion, moral hazard impacts more heavily on wealthier borrow-
ers and of course the eﬀect is heavier for people with larger eﬀort aversion. We can now state
the following result:
Lemma 1. Given a certain eﬀort aversion µj, marginal poor entrepreneurs are the ﬁrst to exit
from the market:
dµ
dw
|Uij(.)=0 > 0 (7)
Proof. See the Appendix
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Condition (7) is crucial for at least two reasons. First it constitutes a signal about the
possibility of inequality of opportunity in the market. The hard-working agents are excluded from
the market due to their initial conditions and independently from their level of eﬀort aversion.
Second, concerning the role of private information on wealth, we observe that decreasing absolute
risk aversion may turn wealth (and availability to post collateral) into a bad signal. Moreover
another eﬀect is in place because of the combination between wealth and eﬀort aversion. In
order to catch the idea, let us suppose (as proposed in the model) four classes of entrepreneurs ij
∈ {R,P}× {L;H}. In this setting rich borrowers (both types) could beneﬁt from not signaling
their wealth because of an implicit cross subsidy they would earn in a pooling with hard working
poor entrepreneurs.
3.2 Single-crossing preferences
To investigate the type of equilibria that may arise in the multidimensional framework, it is
useful to analyse a diagrammatic representation able to capture the impact of endogenous adverse
selection on wealth and eﬀort aversion and its consequent eﬀect in terms of moral hazard. Using
(1) and from the Envelope Theorem, we know that the slope of an indiﬀerence curve of a borrower
in the (X, c)− space is:
sij(X, c) =
dX
dc
< 0 (8)
Proof. See the Appendix
representing the marginal rate of substitution between income in the two states at a certain
contract (X, c). The ﬁrst element in order to establish the possibility of separating equilibria is
the slope of the indiﬀerence curves with respect to the wealth dimension of borrowers. In this
respect we try to single out the direct eﬀect of risk preferences from the impact of moral hazard.
We rewrite the slope of the indiﬀerence curve in (8) as:
sij(X, c) =
dX
dc
= Mij(w)Rij(w)
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where Mij(w) = − (1−p(eij))p(eij) while Ri(w) =
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij)
where WSij = Y −Xij + wij and WFij =
wij − cij .
The curvature of the indiﬀerence curve with respect to changes in wealth is then:
∂
∂w
(sij(X, c)) = Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) +M
′
ij(w)Rij(w) ≷ 0 (9)
Proof. See the Appendix
Here Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) captures the risk preference eﬀect while M
′
ij(w)Rij(w) captures the im-
pact of moral hazard. Not surprisingly (9) has an ambiguous sign. On one side, the eﬀect of
(decreasing) risk aversion makes the indiﬀerence curve ﬂatter as wealth increases. On the other
side the negative impact of moral hazard makes it steeper. Indeed, for a given project choice, due
to decreasing absolute risk aversion, rich individuals require a smaller reduction in the repayment
rate to compensate for an increase in collateral (e.g., they are more willing to post collateral).
Whenever the impact of moral hazard prevails as in eq. (10), rich individuals put such a lower
level of eﬀort, and their probability of success diminishes by so much that their trade-oﬀ between
collateral and interest rate becomes worse than poor people's one, notwithstanding their lower
risk aversion:
∂eij
∂w
> p(eij)(1− p(eij))(A(WSij )−A(WFij )) (10)
Proof. See the Appendix
Note that this ambiguity in general means that the single crossing property of indiﬀerence
curves, which is a necessary condition to ensure the possibility of separation, does not hold as a
general rule.
Now let us investigate the impact of eﬀort aversion µj on the marginal rate of substitution
between repayment X and collateral c. Independently by the amount of endowed wealth, en-
trepreneurs characterized by L−eﬀort aversion display a relative preference for posting more
collateral compared to the ones characterized by H−eﬀort aversion at any point in the space
(X, c) due to their higher success probability. Thus the impact of eﬀort aversion is always the
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same and this implies that independently by which one of the two eﬀects prevails the slope of
indiﬀerence curves with high eﬀort aversion should be steeper.
When ∂∂w (sij(X, c)) > 0, for instance, the direct impact of decreasing risk aversion exceeds
the eﬀect of moral hazard9. Thus intuitively the marginal cost of the repayment is globally lower
for richer or lower eﬀort aversion agents, holding the other characteristic constant.
Let us now consider the slope of the isoproﬁt curve for a bank lending to the borrower of
class ij only:
dX
dc
|p¯iij = −
(1− p(eij)) + (dp(eij)/dc) (X − c)
p(eij) + (dp(eij)/dX) (X − c) (11)
where p¯iij is the bank's expected proﬁt from the borrower of class i. Since dp(eij)/dX is
negative, (11) could in principle be positive. Note that this becomes more likely for high values
of X and lower values of c (see Coco, 1999). We may immediately note that, by construction,
under this information structure, individuals with a larger wealth (higher risk from the point of
view of banks) may prefer contracts that are actuarially fair for poor individuals due to decreasing
risk aversion.
4 Inequality of opportunity equilibria
Under perfect information (our benchmark case), both wealth and eﬀort aversion are observable
and ﬁrst-best conditions can be realized for each type of entrepreneurs ij ∈ {R,P}×{L;H}. In
particular we can observe that a competitive equilibrium credit policy maximizes a borrower's
expected utility (for each type of borrower ij) as follows:
max
{(Xij ;cij)}
p(eij)U(Y −Xij + wi) + (1− p(eij))U(wi − cij)− µjeij (12)
subject to the lender's zero proﬁt condition on each type of borrower ij ∈ {R,P} × {L;H}.
p(eij)Xij + (1− p(eij))cij = K (13)
9When ∂
∂w
(sij(X, c)) < 0, the procedure is analogous at least for type−RH and type−PL.
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Proposition 1. Under perfect information and independently by their amount of wealth, each
L− borrower accepts the contract C(X∗iL, 0) where X∗iL = Kp(eiL) , and eiL is the ﬁrst best eﬀort
choice for iL−types. No collateral is required.
Proof. See the Appendix
Intuitively, in the ﬁrst best case, each ij−borrower may in principle get the contract C(Xij , 0)
with no collateral provision10. However since lenders can observe agent's eﬀort aversion, they
decide to exclude from the market all H−types due to their negative expected returns neglecting
any eﬀort evaluation of their wealth classes.
Let's now turn to the search for equilibria in the framework where entrepreneurial wealth and
eﬀort aversion are both private information. For ∀i ∈ [R,P ] and ∀j ∈ [L,H], the maximization
procedure would be:
max
{(Xij ;cij),(Xij ;cij)}
{λν [p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH ]
+λ(1− ν) [p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL]
+(1− λ)v [p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ]
+(1− λ)(1− ν) [p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL]} (14)
subject to twelve incentive constraints and the representative lender's zero proﬁt condition
on each ij−type ∈ [R,P ]× [L;H] (see the Appendix for a detailed list of incentive constraints).
Note that the natural source of aggregate uncertainty on banking system is here determined
by the combination of endogenous adverse selection on wealth and eﬀort aversion, whereby the
interaction of preferences and feasible contracts in the dimensional space makes it diﬃcult to
deﬁne a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Our starting point has to be the fact that we have both positive and adverse selection of
contract terms (particularly collateral). Hence an increase in collateral for example can lead
to exit of high-eﬀort averse types (poor or rich depending on the initial contract) but also
10Of course the contract above must be supported by the threat of charging a higher interest rate if eﬀort
supplied and veriﬁed ex-post by the bank is not the ﬁrst best.
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more simply of poor entrepreneurs with low eﬀort aversion. What we know for sure is that,
given a certain level of eﬀort-aversion, poor entrepreneurs exit ﬁrst because of decreasing risk
aversion. And conversely that, for a given wealth-type, individuals with higher eﬀort aversion
exit ﬁrst. An important issue concerns the relative slope of the indiﬀerence curves of diﬀerent
types. As we observed above, the relative slope of poor vs rich types, keeping constant their eﬀort
aversion, cannot be ascertained a priori as it depends on the relative strength of risk aversion
versus incentive eﬀect. Instead we know that within a wealth class less eﬀort-averse types are
necessarily more willing to post collateral at any contract (e.g., ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves), thus
suggesting that separation within wealth classes would be in principle feasible. But separation
of wealth types is actually not feasible given the violation of the single crossing property.
We will start the analysis of possible equilibria looking at portions of the contract space where
all types participate. Let us look at Figure 1 where we observe the participation constraint of poor
entrepreneurs with high eﬀort-aversion type denoted PCPH and that of the poor entrepreneurs
with low eﬀort aversion PCPL. In area A below the PCPH , every type participates at any
contract. However because all H−types participate, it is quite unlikely that a feasible zero-proﬁt
pooling contract could be oﬀered. However suppose there exists a potential global pooling zero-
proﬁt contract at C1 (or any point in area A). This contract is not an equilibrium one, as we
know that PL−type can always be attracted by an appropriate higher-collateral contract due to
ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves, and that it will deﬁnitely deliver higher proﬁts to the bank11. Hence a
pure pooling equilibrium oﬀered to all types is not feasible. However we know that a separating
equilibrium with a contract for the H−type is never feasible by deﬁnition (the surplus would be
too low due to negative expected return). Hence no contract is feasible in area A.
Now suppose that there is a contract C2 in area B, above the PCPH , where a bank breaks
even with a contract with the 3 remaining types (PL,RH,RL). Again to explore the possibility
that this pooling contract is an equilibrium we should analyse the relative slopes of indiﬀerence
curves of diﬀerent types. We know that for a competitive lender, L−types represent the ones
delivering proﬁts at any given contract and that rich borrowers with low eﬀort aversion (IRL)
have deﬁnitely ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves than rich borrowers with high eﬀort aversion (IRH). So
11Other types can be attracted as well depending on the relative slope but what really matters is that the
additional contract is not preferred by low wealth/high eﬀort aversion types.
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it is always possible to oﬀer a contract separating RL−types and delivering positive proﬁts. A
three-types pooling can be excluded as well by competition.
Since the single crossing property does not hold any more, evaluating the simultaneous eﬀect
of risk aversion and incentive eﬀect is required at this stage in order to establish ﬁxed monotonic-
ity condition. Let us start by analysing the case where the risk aversion eﬀect is larger than the
moral hazard one
(
∂
∂w (sij(X, c)) > 0
)
. In this case monotonicity conditions among types hold
based on their willingness to post collateral:
XRL < min{XPL;XRH} < max{XPL;XRH} < XPH (15)
while,
cRL > max{cPL, cRH} > min{cPL, cRH} > cPH (16)
Two cases may arise depending on an evaluation of the willingness to post collateral of
intermediate types. The most interesting one suggests that cRH > cPL, i.e., intuitively, the
indiﬀerence curve of PL−type is in principle steeper than RH−one12. In this case a pooling
contract can be oﬀered to RH− and PL− types. Thus the contract Cˆ in ﬁgure 2 is oﬀered on
the zero proﬁt line (OPL/RH) for the RH−type and PL−type, while freeing the RL−type for a
higher collateral `fair'13 contract (on the separating contract line ORL), like CRL. The following
proposition formally clariﬁes all the previous characteristics of the contract.
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information on both wealth and eﬀort aversion, if the risk
aversion eﬀect prevails, (cRH > cPL), a partial pooling equilibrium in pure strategies (Xˆ, cˆ) exists
between PL− and RH−classes, with a separating contract for RL−type and it is characterized
by the pair of contracts:
C(X, c) = {(XRL, cRL);(Xˆ, cˆ)}
where cRL > cˆ while XRL < Xˆ.
Proof. See the Appendix
12e.g.when the risk aversion direct eﬀect prevails
13Meaning with no cross-subsidy.
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Note that this contract lies necessarily on the PCPH line. Any contract above this partici-
pation constraint would not be a stable equilibrium because an additional contract north west
of it could always steal the more proﬁtable (PL)-types. Contract Cˆ in ﬁgure 2 instead cannot
be broken as moving north west would necessarily bring in also the worse (PH) types and the
additional contract would not be proﬁtable.
Now let us examine the features of this equilibrium. At the pooling contract (Cˆ), PL− types
are systematically cross subsidizing RH−types, who realize negative NPV projects. This means
that the terms of the contract will be penalizing for poor hard working types. In this case rich
types get access to credit whatever their eﬀort aversion. Therefore inequality of opportunity
follows immediately. Note ﬁnally that by assumption RH−types carry out their project due to
cross subsidization but they are actually burning some surplus.
Whenever instead, the incentive eﬀect prevails ( ∂∂w (sij(X, c)) < 0), then the slope of IPL
will be ﬂatter than that of IRL and therefore necessarily also of IRH . Monotonicity conditions
among types hold in a diﬀerent way such that:
XPL < min{XPH ;XRL} < max{XPH ;XRL} < XRH (17)
while
cPL > max{cPH , cRL} > min{cPH , cRL} > cRH (18)
We may show that whenever the moral hazard eﬀect is instead higher than the risk aversion
impact, there exists no contract that can be part of a stable equilibrium since it is always possible
to propose a higher collateral contract which attracts L−type borrowers independently by their
wealth level.
Proposition 3. Under asymmetric information on both wealth and eﬀort aversion, when the
moral hazard prevails no equilibrium exists among wealth classes and poor entrepreneurs are
rationed out from the market
Proof. See the Appendix
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Proposition 3 suggests that it is always possible to ﬁnd a contract that steals from the
candidate three-types pooling the RL−type also steals the PL−type, making it all the more
proﬁtable. So the only possible equilibrium contract set in this area would be a contract sepa-
rating RH−type from the rest. However separating the RH−type is impossible because their
projects deliver negative return. In this case no set of contracts in area B (area below PCPL) of
ﬁgure 2 can represent an equilibrium, meaning that PL−type will be excluded from the market.
A separating contract for the RL−type excluding all other types with a suﬃciently large amount
of collateral will be devised by the bank14. As a consequence poor entrepreneurs are systemati-
cally excluded from the market due to their inability to distinguish themselves from RH−type.
Inequality of opportunity is apparent.
Let us ﬁnally discuss the equilibria we found in the propositions on the basis of available
evidence on credit markets in developing countries. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2010) list some stylized
established facts:
a) Richer people borrow more (wealth dependence);
b) Richer people pay lower interest rates;
c) These divergences in interest rates are not driven by diﬀerences in default rates;
d) Lending rates vary widely in the same credit market;
Of course both our equilibria are consistent with fact a), while the ﬁrst one (the only one
where poor entrepreneurs participate) is obviously consistent with fact b). Poor entrepreneurs
pay the higher interest rate, while rich ones pay the high or the low one depending on their
quality (e.g., eﬀort aversion). The second equilibrium is also clearly consistent with fact c). Poor
entrepreneurs pay a higher interest rate, notwithstanding their low default rates, mainly because
they subsidize bad quality types. The same equilibrium is also compatible with fact d)15.
Finally note that inequality of opportunity in equilibrium results in poor entrepreneurs be-
ing, on average, necessarily of better 'quality' (eﬀort aversion in our speciﬁcation) than richer
ones. To our knowledge the only test for this hypothesis has been performed by Evans and
Jovanovich (1989), who ﬁnd that 'the correlation of entrepreneurial ability and assets is negative
14This is feasible considering that types−RH exit ﬁrst.
15Note that in developed countries the risk premia on loans are usually low and not very variable across loans
(see Black and De Meza, 1997).
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and statistically signiﬁcant'.
5 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to investigate whether equality of opportunity actually holds in a
credit market with heterogeneity on unobservable circumstances and responsibility, respectively
wealth and eﬀort aversion, and to discuss the relation between violation of EOp and eﬃcient
credit allocation. Only if all equally-qualiﬁed applicants get credit whatever their endowment
situation, the ideal of equality of opportunity holds. In our setting equality of opportunity
requires that individuals with the same level of the responsibility (same eﬀort aversion) variable
be oﬀered the same opportunities.
We show due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, moral hazard results in rich borrowers
supplying less eﬀort to their projects compared to the poor ones. The combination of these fea-
tures with an endogenous adverse selection on both wealth and eﬀort aversion delivers a complex
environment where the search for equilibria is particularly diﬃcult. We demonstrate that any
equilibrium entails some forms of inequality of opportunity. In some cases no poor entrepreneur
gets credit due to her inability to separate herself from worse (rich) entrepreneurs. Some surplus
is lost as a consequence. Under other restrictions instead a partial separating equilibrium with
cross-subsidization between classes exists, where not only equality of opportunity is violated, but
poor entrepreneurs with a higher level of responsibility (lower eﬀort aversion) cross-subsidize the
rich ones with lower responsibility. Access to the credit market is thus paid by hard-working poor
entrepreneurs with a perverse redistribution 'tax'. The additional consequence of the subsidy is
that negative surplus projects are carried out. In this case eﬃciency and equity violations occur
jointly. This last equilibrium is consistent with most consensus micro-evidence on credit markets
particularly in developing countries.
Finally note that wealth heterogeneity is the very factor impeding the perfect screening of
types. In absence of wealth heterogeneity, eﬀort aversion is correctly (e.g., inversely) correlated
with the willingness to post collateral in order to obtain screening. Therefore when full ex-
ante redistribution of wealth is possible, leading to uniform wealth levels in the population of
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entrepreneurs, willingness to post collateral correctly signals low eﬀort aversion and the project's
quality. Perfect screening is in principle possible and only good projects, those carried out by
low eﬀort aversion entrepreneurs, are realized in equilibrium. Hence a perfectly egalitarian ex-
ante redistribution of resources improves eﬃciency because it ensures that good projects, and
only good projects, are carried out, thus avoiding also waste from realization of negative surplus
projects. Contemporaneously, and by deﬁnition, in this equilibrium entrepreneurs get credit on
the basis solely of the responsibility variable. This intervention would therefore improve ﬁnal
allocations both on distributive grounds, at least under the equality of opportunity benchmark,
and on eﬃciency grounds.
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6 Figures
Figure 1: No equilibrium in areas A and B
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Figure 2: Partial separating equilibrium with cross-subsidization
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7 Appendix
Proof of equation (5). Starting by eq. (3) and assuming that WSij = Y − Xij + wij and
WFij = wij − cij , we can simply rewrite that:
∂U
∂eij
= p′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
)− µj
By the Implicit Function theorem and due to decreasing absolute risk aversion, we simply observe
that: [
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
)]
de+
[
p′(eij)
(
U ′(WSij )− U ′(WFij )
)]
dw = 0[
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
)]
de = − [p′(eij) (U ′(WSij )− U ′(WFij ))] dw
which implies:
de∗ij
dw
= −
p′(eij)
(
U ′(WSij )− U ′(WFij )
)
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
) < 0
Proof of equation (6). With a similar procedure shown in eq. (5), we may write:
[
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
)]
de− dµ = 0
[
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
)]
de = dµ
indicating,
de∗ij
dµ
=
1
p′′(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
) < 0
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Proof of Lemma 1. In the marginal set, individuals have utility equal to zero. By the envelope
theorem and diﬀerentiating equation with respect to µ and w, we observe that:
[−eij ] dµ+
[
p(eij)U
′(WSij ) + (1− p(eij)U ′(WFij )
]
dw =
[−eij ] dµ = −
[
p(eij)U
′(WSij ) + (1− p(eij)U ′(WFij )
]
dw
which implies that:
dµ
dw
|Uij(.)=0 = −
[
p(eij)U
′(WSi ) + (1− p(eij)U ′(WFi )
]
[−eij ] > 0
Proof of equation (8). Starting by eq. (1):
Uij = p(eij)U(W
S
ij ) + (1− p(eij))U(WFij )− µjeij
By envelope theorem and diﬀerentiating with respect to X and c, it follows that:
[−p(eij)U ′(WSij )] dX − [(1− p(eij))U ′(WFij )] dc = 0
[−p(eij)U ′(WSij )] dX = [(1− p(eij))U ′(WFij )] dc
which implies that:
sij(X, c) =
dX
dc
= −(1− p(eij))U
′(WFij )
p(eij)U ′(WSij )
< 0
Proof of equation (9). We can again rewrite the slope of the indiﬀerence curve as:
sij(X, c) =
dX
dc
= Mij(w)Rij(w)
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whereMij(w) = − (1−p(eij))p(eij) while Rij(w) =
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij)
. The curvature of the indiﬀerence curve with
respect to change in wealth is then:
∂
∂w
(
dX
dc
)
= Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) +M
′
ij(w)Rij(w)
whereMij(w)R
′
ij(w) captures the eﬀect of risk preference whileM
′
ij(w)Rij(w) explains the moral
hazard eﬀect. First, let us solve Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) :
Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) = −
(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
U ′′(WFij )U ′(WSij )− U ′′(WSij )U ′(WFij )(
U ′(WSij )
)2
 =
= −(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
U ′′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
− U
′′(WSij )U
′(WFij )(
U ′(WSij )
)2
 =
= −(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
1
U ′(WSij )
[
U ′′(WFij )−
U ′′(WSij )U
′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
]
=
= −(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
[
U ′′(WFij )
U ′(WFij )
− U
′′(WSij )
U ′(WSij )
]
Let us deﬁne A(W ) as the coeﬃcient of decreasing absolute risk aversion, we can then rewrite
Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) as:
Mij(w)R
′
i(w) = −
(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)
=
dX
dc
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)
> 0
Since WSij > W
F
ij and considering decreasing absolute risk aversion i.e. risk aversion decreases
with wealth, A(WFij ) > A
(
WSij
)
and that by construction that dXdc is negative, we can surely say
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that the eﬀect of risk preferences Mij(w)R
′
ij(w) is positive. Then we can solve M
′
ij(w)Rij(w):
M ′ij(w)Rij(w) =
[
−−p
′(eij)
∂eij
∂w p(eij)− (1− p(eij))p′(eij)
∂eij
∂w
(p(eij))
2
]
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
=
=
[
p′(eij)
∂eij
∂w
(p(eij))
+
(1− p(eij))p′(eij)∂eij∂w
(p(eij))
2
]
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
=
=
p′(eij)
p(eij)
∂eij
∂w
[
1 +
(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
]
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
=
=
p′(eij)
p(eij)
∂eij
∂w
[
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
− dX
dc
]
=
= −p
′(eij)
p(eij)
∂eij
∂w
[
dX
dc
− U
′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
]
< 0
Therefore,
∂
∂w
(
dX
dc
)
=
dX
dc
(
A(WSi )−A(WFi )
)− p′(eij)
p(eij)
∂eij
∂w
(
dX
dc
− U
′(WFi )
U ′(WSi )
)
≶ 0
As shown, the sign of eq. (9) is uncertain due to the combination of the positive eﬀect of risk aver-
sion
(
dX
dc
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
))
and the negative moral hazard impact−p′(eij)p(eij)
∂eij
∂w
(
dX
dc −
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij)
)
.
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Proof of equation (10). After some algebraic manipulations,
∂
∂w
(
dX
dc
)
= sij
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)− ∂eij
∂w
p′(eij)
p(eij)
(
sij −
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
)
=
= sij(1− p(eij))
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)− ∂eij
∂w
p′(eij)
(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
(
sij −
U ′(WFij )
U ′(WSij )
)
=
= sij(1− p(eij))
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)− ∂eij
∂w
p′(eij)
((
(1− p(eij))
p(eij)
)
sij + sij
)
=
= sij(1− p(eij))
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)− ∂eij
∂w
p′(eij)
sij
p(eij)
= sij
(1− p(eij)) (A(WSij )−A(WFij ))− ∂eij∂w 1p(eij)(U(WSij )− U(WFij ))
 =
=
sij
p(eij)
(
U(WSij )− U(WFij )
) (p(eij)(1− p(eij)) (A(WSij )−A(WFij ))− ∂eij∂w
)
The impact of moral hazard prevails if and only if:
∂eij
∂w
> p(eij)(1− p(eij))
(
A(WSij )−A(WFij )
)
Proof of Proposition 1. Looking at the Lagrangian maximization,
L = p(eij)U(Y −Xij + wij) + (1− p(eij))U(wij − cij)− µjeij
+φ (p(eij)Xij + (1− p(eij))cij −K)
and, substituting for Xij , into the zero proﬁt constraint such that Xij =
K−(1−p(eij))cij
p(eij)
, the
following optimization problem must be solved:
p(eij)U(Y −
[
K − (1− p(eij))cij
p(eij)
]
+ wi) + (1− p(eij))U(wi − cij)− µjeij
+φ
(
p(eij)
[
K − (1− p(eij))cij
p(eij)
]
+ (1− p(eij))cij −K
)
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Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with respect to cij :
∂L
∂cij
= U ′(WSij )− U ′(WFij ) < 0
Thus, the required collateral cij is zero and the repayment Xij =
K
p(eij)
for each type.
Proof of Proposition 2. As a ﬁrst step, we indicate a complete list of the incentive constraints
for each entrepreneur-ij, where i ∈ [R,P ] and j ∈ [L,H]. For the RH−type,
p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH ≥ (19)
p(eRH)U(Y −XRL + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRL)− µHeRH
p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH ≥ (20)
p(eRH)U(Y −XPH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cPH)− µHeRH
p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH ≥ (21)
p(eRH)U(Y −XPL + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cPL)− µHeRH
For the RL−type,
p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL ≥ (22)
p(eRL)U(Y −XRH + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRH)− µLeRL
p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL ≥ (23)
p(eRL)U(Y −XPH + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cPH)− µLeRL
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p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL ≥ (24)
p(eRL)U(Y −XPL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cPL)− µLeRL
For the PH−type,
p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ≥ (25)
p(ePH)U(Y −XRH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cRH)− µHePH
p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ≥ (26)
p(ePH)U(Y −XRL + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cRL)− µHePH
p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ≥ (27)
p(ePH)U(Y −XPL + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPL)− µHePH
For the PL−type,
p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL ≥ (28)
p(ePL)U(Y −XRH + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cRH)− µLePL
p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL ≥ (29)
p(ePL)U(Y −XRL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cRL)− µLePL
p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL ≥ (30)
p(ePL)U(Y −XPH + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPH)− µLePL
Now we need to study the incentive compatibility constraints for each type and then summing
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them two by two in order to obtain a partial ranking in terms of collateral and repayment required.
First, adding ICRH/PH with ICPH/RH and ICPL/RL with ICRL/PL implies that XRj > XPj
while cRj < cPj ∀j ∈ [L,H] as conﬁrmed by the previous analysis of unidimensional case on
observable eﬀort aversion. This means that by taking into account eﬀort aversion the repayment
rate required by the bank for rich types must be necessarily higher than the one imposed to
poor types based on their collateral provision cPj since they are the most eﬃcient types given
eﬀort aversion. Moreover going on, we add ICPL/PH with ICPH/PL, we obtain that XiH > XiL
while ciH < ciL. Obviously, this result does not take into account the eﬀect of negative expected
return of H−type in terms of equilibrium but just suggests that given individual's wealth, higher
repayment should be required to individuals with higher eﬀort aversion with respect to ones
with low eﬀort aversion since the latter are more willing to post collateral due to their higher
probability of success. Thus the examined incentive constraints among types allows us to show
some monotonicity conditions on the credit policy proposed by the banks in terms of willingness
to post collateral. First evaluating ICRL/PL with ICPL/PH we simply obtains that the global
downward incentive constraint ICRL/PH is satisﬁed when the two local constraints are satisﬁed.
Moreover, ICRL/PL plus ICPL/RH implies ICRL/RH , while ICPL/RH plus ICRH/PH implies
ICPL/PH . Finally, ICRL/RH plus ICRH/PL implies ICRL/PL while ICRH/PL plus ICPL/PH
implies ICRH/PH . We study the case when risk aversion eﬀect is higher than the moral hazard
impact. In this case monotonicity conditions among types (15) and (16) hold based on their
willingness to post collateral. The most interesting case is realized when cRH > cPL, i.e.,
intuitively, the indiﬀerence curve of PL−type is in principle steeper than RH−one. Thus for our
maximization procedure, we remain with the only local constraint ICPH/RH , ICRH/PL, ICPL/RL
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plus the lender's zero proﬁt condition of each type:
L = {λν [p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH ]
+λ(1− ν) [p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL]
+(1− λ)v [p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ]
+(1− λ)(1− ν) [p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL]}
+φ{p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH
−p(ePH)U(Y −XRH + wPH)− (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cRH) + µHePH}
+γ{p(eRH)U(Y −XRH + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH
−p(eRH)U(Y −XPL + wRH)− (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cPL) + µHeRH}
+τ{p(ePL)U(Y −XPL + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL
−p(ePL)U(Y −XRL + wPL)− (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cRL) + µLePL}
Substituting for Xij , from the zero proﬁt condition for each type ij for ∀i ∈ [R,P ] and ∀j ∈
[L,H], such that Xij =
K−(1−p(eij))cij
p(eij)
:
L = {λν
[
p(eRH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wRH
)
+ (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH
]
+λ(1− ν)
[
p(eRL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRL))cRL
p(eRL)
]
+ wRL
)
+ (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL
]
+(1− λ)v
[
p(ePH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePH))cPH
p(ePH)
]
+ wPH
)
+ (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH
]
+(1− λ)(1− ν)
[
p(ePL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wPL
)
+ (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL
]
}
+φ{p(ePH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePH))cPH
p(ePH)
]
+ wPH
)
+ (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH
−p(ePH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wPH
)
− (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cRH) + µHePH}
+γ{p(eRH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wRH
)
+ (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cRH)− µHeRH
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−p(eRH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
− (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cPL) + µHeRH}
+τ{p(ePL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wPL
)
+ (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cPL)− µLePL
−p(ePL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRL))cRL
p(eRL)
]
+ wPL
)
− (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cRL) + µLePL}
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with respect to cPH , we obtain
∂L
∂cPH
= (1− λ)vp(ePH)U ′(WSPH)
(1− p(ePH))
p(ePH)
− (1− λ)v(1− p(ePH))U ′(WFPH)
+φp(ePH)U
′(WSPH)
(1− p(ePH))
p(ePH)
− φ(1− p(ePH))U ′(WFPH)
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with respect to cRH , it follows that:
∂L
∂cRH
= λvp(eRH)U
′(WSRH)
(1− p(eRH))
p(eRH)
− λv(1− p(eRH))U ′(WFRH)
−φp(ePH)U ′
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wPH
)
(1− p(eRH))
p(eRH)
+ φ(1− p(ePH))U ′(wPH − cRH)
+γp(eRH)U
′(WSRH)
(1− p(eRH))
p(eRH)
− γ(1− p(eRH))U ′(WFRH) = 0
Diﬀerentiating with respect to cPL, we instead obtain:
∂L
∂cPL
= (1− λ)(1− ν)p(ePL)U ′(WSPL)
(1− p(ePL))
p(ePL)
− (1− λ)(1− ν)(1− p(ePL))U ′(WFPL)
−γp(eRH)U ′
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1− p(ePL))
p(ePL)
+ γ(1− p(eRH))U ′(wRH − cPL)
+τp(ePL)U
′(WSPL)
(1− p(ePL))
p(ePL)
− τ(1− p(ePL))U ′(WFPL) = 0
Finally, diﬀerentiating with respect to cRL,
∂L
∂cRL
= λ(1− ν)p(eRL)U ′(WSRL)
(1− p(eRL))
p(eRL)
− λ(1− ν)(1− p(eRL))U ′(WFRL)
−τp(ePL)U ′
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1− p(eRL))
p(eRL)
+ τ(1− p(ePL))U ′(wPL − cRL)
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Thus,
• ∂L∂cPH = ((1− λ)v + φ) [U ′(WSPH)−U ′(WFPH)] < 0 PH−type are excluded from the market
or must get a contract such that cPH = 0
• ∂L∂cRH = (λv + γ)U ′(WSRH)(1− p(eRH))−φ
p(ePH)
p(eRH)
U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wPH
)
(1−
p(eRH))− (λv + γ)U ′(WFRH)(1− p(eRH)) + φ(1− p(ePH))U ′(wPH − cRH) < 0
since ﬁrst, (λv + γ) [U ′(WSRH)− U ′(WFRH)] < 0 second,
• −φp(ePH)p(eRH)U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(eRH))cRH
p(eRH)
]
+ wPH
)
(1−p(eRH))+φ(1−p(ePH))U ′(wPH−cRH) <
0 since

p(ePH)
p(eRH)
> 1; p(ePH) > p(eRH); (1− p(eRH)) > (1− p(ePH)) and Y − Kp(eRH) + 2cRH −
p(eRH)cRH > 0
Thus, even in this case RH−type are excluded from the market or otherwise may implement a
contract if and only if cPH = 0
• ∂L∂cPL = ((1− λ)(1− ν) + τ)U ′(WSPL)(1−p(ePL))−γ
p(eRH)
p(ePL)
U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1−
p(ePL))
• − ((1− λ)(1− ν) + τ) (1− p(ePL))U ′(WFPL) + γ(1− p(eRH))U ′(wRH − cPL) < 0
since ﬁrst ((1− λ)(1− ν) + τ) [U ′(WSPL)− U ′(WFPL)] (1− p(ePL)) < 0 and
second, −γ p(eRH)p(ePL)U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1 − p(ePL)) + γ(1 − p(eRH))U ′(wRH −
cPL) < 0 since the risk aversion eﬀect prevails to the moral hazard one.
(1−p(ePL))p(eRH)
(1−p(eRH))p(ePL) > 1,Y −
K
p(ePL)
+ 2cPL − p(ePL)cPL > 0
Thus cPL = 0 is the only possibility to get the contract.
• ∂L∂cRL = λ(1− ν)p(eRL)U ′(WSRL)
(1−p(eRL))
p(eRL)
− λ(1− ν)(1− p(eRL))U ′(WFRL)
−τp(ePL)U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1−p(eRL))
p(eRL)
+ τ(1− p(ePL))U ′(wPL − cRL) < 0
since λ(1− ν)[U ′(WSRL)− U ′(WFRL)](1− p(eRL)) < 0
and
−τp(ePL)U ′
(
Y −
[
K−(1−p(ePL))cPL
p(ePL)
]
+ wRH
)
(1−p(eRL))
p(eRL)
+ τ(1− p(ePL))U ′(wPL − cRL) < 0
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Finally cRL = 0 is the only acceptable policy. We can thus observe that there is no possi-
bility to use collateral as a sorting device among types and consequently there is no possibility
to get separating policies in order to favour or guarantee access to credit for the most eﬃcient
types, independently of their amount of wealth. Moreover, we may show that potential pooling
contracts among all four types (RL,PL; , RH,PH) or three types (RL,PL; , RH) above the
PH−participation constraint are excluded from the market. Let us observe if a pooling equilib-
rium (Xˆ, cˆ) is possible among wealth classes mixing eﬀort aversions (PL;RH). We examine the
following incentive constraint ICRH−PL/RL,
p(eRL)U(Y − Xˆ + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cˆ)µLeRL ≥ (31)
p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL
and the PH−participation constraint:
p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ≥ 0 (32)
The optimization problem in this case would be the following:
L = {λ(1− ν) [p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL]
+(1− λ)v [p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ]
+λˆυˆ[p(eRH)U(Y − Xˆ + wRH) + (1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cˆ)− µHeRH
+p(ePL)U(Y − Xˆ + wPL) + (1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cˆ)− µLePL]}
+φ[p(eRL)U(Y − Xˆ + wRL) + (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cˆ)− µLeRL
−p(eRL)U(Y −XRL + wRL)− (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL) + µLeRL]
+γ[p(ePH)U(Y −XPH + wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ]
where λˆυˆ = λv+ (1−λ)(1− v).Substituting for Xij , from the zero proﬁt condition for each type
ij for ∀i ∈ [R,P ] and ∀j ∈ [L,H], such that Xij = K−(1−p(eij))cijp(eij) and looking at he repayment
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rate in case of pooling contract, Xˆ,
Xˆ =
K − [(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))]cˆ
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)]
we can rewrite the maximization procedure as follows:
L = {λ(1− ν)
[
p(eRL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRL))cRL
p(eRL)
]
+ wRL
)
+ (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL)− µLeRL
]
+(1− λ)v
[
p(ePH)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePH))cPH
p(ePH)
]
+ wPH
)
+ (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH
]
+λˆυˆ[p(eRH)U
(
Y −
[
K − [(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))]cˆ
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)]
]
+ wRH
)
+(1− p(eRH))U(wRH − cˆ)− µHeRH
+p(ePL)U
(
Y −
[
K − [(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))]cˆ
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)]
]
+ wPL
)
+(1− p(ePL))U(wPL − cˆ)− µLePL]}
+φ[p(eRL)U
(
Y −
[
K − [(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))]cˆ
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)]
]
+ wRL
)
+(1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cˆ)− µLeRL
−p(eRL)U
(
Y −
[
K − (1− p(eRL))cRL
p(eRL)
]
+ wRL
)
− (1− p(eRL))U(wRL − cRL) + µLeRL]
+γ[p(ePH)U(Y −
[
K − (1− p(ePH))cPH
p(ePH)
]
+ wPH) + (1− p(ePH))U(wPH − cPH)− µHePH ]
Diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with respect to cRL, it follows that:
∂L
∂cRL
= λ(1− ν)p(eRL)U ′(WSRL)
(1− p(eRL))
p(eRL)
− λ(1− ν)(1− p(eRL))U ′(WFRL)
−φp(eRL)U ′(WSRL)
(1− p(eRL))
p(eRL)
+ φ(1− p(eRL))U ′(WFRL) > 0
thus revealing that a contract with a positive amount of cRL is in principle possible based on
the willingness to post collateral of the RL−type Moreover, diﬀerentiating the Lagrangian with
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respect to cˆ, it follows that:
∂L
∂cˆ
= λˆυˆp(eRH)U
′ (.)
(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)] − λˆυˆ (1− p(eRH))U
′(wRH − cˆ)
+λˆυˆp(ePL)U
′ (.)
(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)] − λˆυˆ(1− p(ePL))U
′(wPL − cˆ)
+φp(eRL)U (.)
(1− λ)(1− v)(1− p(ePL)) + λv(1− p(eRH))
[(1− λ)(1− v)p(ePL) + λvp(eRH)] − (1− p(eRL))U
′(wRL − cˆ)
which is positive since Y −
(
K−[(1−λ)(1−v)(1−p(ePL))+λv(1−p(eRH))]
[(1−λ)(1−v)p(ePL)+λvp(eRH)]
)
cˆ+wij > wij−cˆ. Diﬀerentiating
the Lagrangian with respect to cPH , it follows that:
∂L
∂cPH
= (1− λ)vp(ePH)U ′(WSPH)
(1− p(ePH))
p(ePH)
− (1− λ)v(1− p(ePH))U ′(WFPH)
+γp(ePH)U
′(WSPH)
(1− p(ePH))
p(ePH)
− γ(1− p(ePH))U ′(WFPH) < 0
which implies that there is no equilibrium contract for PH-type such that their participation
constraint is satisﬁed. It is worth to note that the only possibility to get a pooling equilibrium is
possible just in the case where the willingness to post collateral of PL−type is higher than the
one of the RH−type and an unfair cross-subsidization is realized among wealth classes. Thus
a partial pooling equilibrium (Xˆ, cˆ) among wealth classes (PL;RH) is possible according to a
separating strategy involving RL−type with a contract cRL > cˆ and Xˆ > XRL since intuitively
they have higher willingness to post collateral.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of the ﬁrst and second part of this proposition is identical
to those of Proposition 4. In order to verify that no (separating or pooling) equilibrium exists
among types, monotonicity conditions are in place such that:
XPL < min{XPH ;XRL} < max{XPH ;XRL} < XRH
while
cPL > max{cPH , cRL} > min{cPH , cRL} > cRH
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In this case it is easy to observe that in accordance with the willingness to post collateral of
intermediate types, respectively PH− and RL− types (cPH ≷ cRL), lenders may always oﬀer a
contract at the zero proﬁt line which attracts only the L−type independently by their available
wealth in order to sort out RH−class from the others. However, due to the negative expected
return on H−type, separating contract is not feasible. A higher amount of collateral would be
required to screen entrepreneurs although the participation constraint of PL−types is not more
satisﬁed. Thus in this case the only possibility is for the RL−types to get a contract implicitly
suggesting that poor entrepreneurs are completely rationed out from the market independently
by their eﬀort aversion level.
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